Epistemic Injustice and the Attention Economy (2020). Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23(5): 777-795 (co-authored with Alfred Archer).
The Right to Press Freedom of Expression vs the Rights of Marginalised Groups: An Answer Grounded in Personhood Rights (2020). In Miguel Garcia-Godinez, Rachael Mellin and Raimo Tuomela (eds.) Social Ontology, Normativity and Law. De Gruyter: Berlin: 79-96.
Structural Alienation: Lu’s Structural Approach to Reconciliation from within a Relational Framework (2019). Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric 11(2): 1-14.
How Might Financial Aid form a part of the Negative Duty Not to Harm, in the Case of Global Poverty? (2018). Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 118, iss. 3: 419-428.
The Curious Case of Ronald McDonald’s Claim to Rights: An Ontological Account of Differences in Group and Individual Person Rights (2018). The Journal of Social Ontology, vol. 4, iss. 1: 1-28.
Suggestions and Challenges for a Social Account of Sensitivity (2016). Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, vol. 5, no. 6 : 18-26. ISSN 2471-9560.
Self-Defence for Marginalised Knowers: The Ethics of Epistemic Nudging.
Impostor Syndrome and Class in Academia.
What social media facilitates, social media should regulate: duties in the digital public sphere (with Fay Niker).
Poverty, Meritocracy and Epistemic Injustice (with Alfred Archer).
Testimony and the Epistemic Enemy
Epistemic Paternalism: Co-opting the Tools of the Oppressor.
The Print Press Media: Collective Responsibility for Breaches of Democratic Duties.
Epistemic Exclusion: Epistemic Objectification and the case of UK Benefit Claimants.
Collections as editor
Special Edition on ‘Collective Agents and Global Structural Injustice’ (February 2021). Journal of Applied Philosophy 38(1). Co-editor.
Poverty and Moral Psychology
Proposal approved. Springer. Co-editor.