‘How Might Financial Aid form a part of the Negative Duty Not to Harm, in the Case of Global Poverty?’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 118, iss. 3 (2018), pp. 419-428.
‘The Curious Case of Ronald McDonald’s Claim to Rights: An Ontological Account of Differences in Group and Individual Person Rights’. The Journal of Social Ontology, vol. 4, iss. 1 (2018), pp. 1-28.
‘Suggestions and Challenges for a Social Account of Sensitivity’. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, vol. 5, no. 6 (2016), pp. 18-26. ISSN 2471-9560.
‘Epistemic Self-Defence: the Permissibility of Epistemic Nudging and Epistemic Negotiation in Resisting Epistemic Injustice’.
‘Collective responsibilities for UK Poverty-Abuse’.
‘Epistemic Exclusion: Epistemic Objectification as a Denial of Subjectivity and Imposed Meaning in the case of UK Benefit Claimants’.
‘Structural Alienation: Lu’s Structural Approach to Reconciliation from within a Relational Framework’. submitted to Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric.
Epistemic Injustice and the Attention Economy (co-authored with Alfred Archer).
Collections as editor
Special Edition on ‘Collective Agents and Global Structural Injustice’ (forthcoming 2019/2020)
Journal of Applied Philosophy
Book collection on Social Personhood (forthcoming TBC)
Rowman and Littlefield
Editor. Author of Introduction and chapter on personhood and epistemic exclusion.