Research

My research has mainly focused on epistemology, theory of normativity and philosophy of mind. In particular, I’m interested in the normative relation between truth and belief. Is truth a reason for belief? How does truth weigh against other epistemic and non-epistemic reasons for belief? How can truth motivate and guide our beliefs?

Publications

Wei, X. (2020) ‘The Role of Pretense in the Process of Self-deception’, Philosophical Explorations,23(1):1-14. DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2020.1711960

Wei, X. (2019) ‘The Permissible Norm of Truth and “Ought Implies Can”’, Logos and Episteme, 10(4): 433-440. DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme201910438

Wei, X. (2015) ‘Does Our Temporal Experience Favour A-theory of Time?’, British Journal of Undergraduate Philosophy, 9(1):11-30.

Presentations (Outside St Andrews/Stirling)

2019/12/7

On Pretense’s Role in the Process of Doxastic Self-Deception 

Mind Graduate Conference on Self-knowledge, University of Warwick

2019/7/2

A Communitarian Account of the Normativity of Belief

Southern Normativity Group Fifth Annual Conference on Normativity, University of Cardiff

2019/5/23

The Permission Norm of Truth and Ought Implies Can

6th Stockholm Philosophy Graduate Conference, University of Stockholm

2019/2/5

Intellectual Autonomy, Expert Testimony and the A Priori

Workshop on Intellectual Autonomy, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid

2018/6/27

Ought We to Believe the Truth?

Graduate Conference on Contemporary Issues Across Ethics and Epistemology, University of Pavia

2017/10/27

Is Self-deception Doxastic?

Workshop on Self-Deception: What It Is and What It Is Worth, University of Basel

2017/8/25

Kant on Friendship

9th European Congress on Analytic Philosophy, LMU

2016/9

Kant on Friendship

UK Kant Society Annual Conference University of Southampton

2015/11

Does our temporal experience favour A-theory of time?

British Undergraduate Philosophy Society Autumn Conference, LSE