My research has mainly focused on epistemology, theory of normativity and philosophy of mind. In particular, I’m interested in the normative relation between truth and belief. Is truth a reason for belief? How does truth weigh against other epistemic and non-epistemic reasons for belief? How can truth motivate and guide our beliefs?


Wei, X. (2020) ‘The Role of Pretense in the Process of Self-deception’, Philosophical Explorations,23(1):1-14. DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2020.1711960

Wei, X. (2019) ‘The Permissible Norm of Truth and “Ought Implies Can”’, Logos and Episteme, 10(4): 433-440. DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme201910438

Wei, X. (2015) ‘Does Our Temporal Experience Favour A-theory of Time?’, British Journal of Undergraduate Philosophy, 9(1):11-30.

Presentations (Outside St Andrews/Stirling)


On Pretense’s Role in the Process of Doxastic Self-Deception 

Mind Graduate Conference on Self-knowledge, University of Warwick


A Communitarian Account of the Normativity of Belief

Southern Normativity Group Fifth Annual Conference on Normativity, University of Cardiff


The Permission Norm of Truth and Ought Implies Can

6th Stockholm Philosophy Graduate Conference, University of Stockholm


Intellectual Autonomy, Expert Testimony and the A Priori

Workshop on Intellectual Autonomy, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid


Ought We to Believe the Truth?

Graduate Conference on Contemporary Issues Across Ethics and Epistemology, University of Pavia


Is Self-deception Doxastic?

Workshop on Self-Deception: What It Is and What It Is Worth, University of Basel


Kant on Friendship

9th European Congress on Analytic Philosophy, LMU


Kant on Friendship

UK Kant Society Annual Conference University of Southampton


Does our temporal experience favour A-theory of time?

British Undergraduate Philosophy Society Autumn Conference, LSE