My research has mainly situated at the intersection of epistemology, theory of normativity and philosophy of mind. I’m currently interested in understanding epistemic risks in moral and political deliberation, epistemic agency and topics in political epistemology such as the epistemic value of democracy and political disagreement.


1. Wei, X. (2022a) ‘Believing for Truth and the Model of Epistemic Guidance’, Inquiry. DOI: 10.1080/0020174x.2022.2126391
2. Wei, X. (2022b) ‘A Practice-based Account of the Truth Norm of Belief’, Episteme, 1-21. DOI:10.1017/epi.2022.26
3. Wei, X. (2020) ‘The Role of Pretense in the Process of Self-deception’, Philosophical Explorations, 23(1):1-14. DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2020.1711960
4. Wei, X. (2019) ‘The Permissible Norm of Truth and “Ought Implies Can”’, Logos and Episteme, 10 (4): 433-440. DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme201910438
5. Wei, X. (2015) ‘Does Our Temporal Experience Favour A-theory of Time?’, British Journal of Undergraduate Philosophy, 9(1):11-30.


1. ‘The Weight of Truth’, Revised & Resubmitted, Synthese.
2. ‘Why Does Normative Risk Matter for What We Should Do Morally’, Under Review.
3. ‘The Value of Political Disagreement’, In Preparation.
4. ‘Public Reason and the Epistemic Challenge’, In Preparation.
5. ‘Believing Something for Reasons as a Mental Action’, In Preparation.