What epistemic norms, if any, govern belief formation and revision? Are there asymmetries between the norms that govern a priori and a posteriori beliefs and those that govern our beliefs about oneself and the beliefs about others? If so, do the asymmetries in norms help us to draw the distinction between a priori-a posteriori and self-other beliefs?


PY2011 Foundations of Western Philosophy, 2017 Semester 1


‘Is self-deception doxastic?’, Workshop: Self-Deception: what it is and what it is worth, University of Basel 2017.10.24-27

‘Kant on Friendship’, 9th European Congress of Analytic Philosophy, University of Munich, 2017.8.21-26

‘Kant on Friendship’, UK Kant Society Annual Conference, University of Southampton, 2016.9.5-6

‘Does our temporal experience favour A-theory of time?’, British Undergraduate Philosophy Society Autumn Conference, LSE, 2015.11

‘B-theory of Time and Temporal Experience’ UCL Philosophy Society Spring Conference, UCL, 2015.3


‘Does our temporal experience favour A-theory of time?’, British Journal of Undergraduate Philosophy, 2015