Research
My research has mainly focused on epistemology, theory of normativity and philosophy of mind. In particular, I’m interested in the normative relation between truth and belief. Is truth a reason for belief? How does truth weigh against other epistemic and non-epistemic reasons for belief? How can truth motivate and guide our beliefs?
Publications
Wei, X. (2020) ‘The Role of Pretense in the Process of Self-deception’, Philosophical Explorations,23(1):1-14. DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2020.1711960
Wei, X. (2019) ‘The Permissible Norm of Truth and “Ought Implies Can”’, Logos and Episteme, 10(4): 433-440. DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme201910438
Wei, X. (2015) ‘Does Our Temporal Experience Favour A-theory of Time?’, British Journal of Undergraduate Philosophy, 9(1):11-30.
Presentations (Outside St Andrews/Stirling)
2019/12/7
On Pretense’s Role in the Process of Doxastic Self-Deception
Mind Graduate Conference on Self-knowledge, University of Warwick
2019/7/2
A Communitarian Account of the Normativity of Belief
Southern Normativity Group Fifth Annual Conference on Normativity, University of Cardiff
2019/5/23
The Permission Norm of Truth and Ought Implies Can
6th Stockholm Philosophy Graduate Conference, University of Stockholm
2019/2/5
Intellectual Autonomy, Expert Testimony and the A Priori
Workshop on Intellectual Autonomy, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid
2018/6/27
Ought We to Believe the Truth?
Graduate Conference on Contemporary Issues Across Ethics and Epistemology, University of Pavia
2017/10/27
Is Self-deception Doxastic?
Workshop on Self-Deception: What It Is and What It Is Worth, University of Basel
2017/8/25
Kant on Friendship
9th European Congress on Analytic Philosophy, LMU
2016/9
Kant on Friendship
UK Kant Society Annual Conference University of Southampton
2015/11
Does our temporal experience favour A-theory of time?
British Undergraduate Philosophy Society Autumn Conference, LSE