My main area of research are deflationary views in metaontology. I am currently trying to make sense of Rudolf Carnap’s philosophy of mathematics in order to better understand Carnap’s overall position with respect to ontological questions. This is not merely of historical interest, but will (I hope) also shed light on contemporary kinds of Neo-Carnapianism (as defended by Amie Thomasson and Agustín Rayo).
Furthermore, I like the philosophy of language (especially demonstratives and their metasemantics) and Kant’s theoretical philosophy (especially his views on mereology).
- Forthcoming: Conceptualizing Kant’s Mereology. Ergo.In the Resolution of the Second Antinomy of the first Critique and the Dynamics chapter of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Sciences, Kant presents his critical views on mereology, the study of parts and wholes. He endorses an unusual position: Matter is said to be infinitely divisible without being infinitely divided. It would be mistaken to think that matter consists of infinitely many parts — rather, parts “exist only in the representation of them, hence in the dividing”. This view, according to which parts are created through division somehow, was criticized as obscure early on, and has not received much attention since. Against this trend, I show how a coherent position, which I call Mereological Conceptualism, can be extracted from the sparse textual basis.
- 2018: Metasemantics, Intentions and Circularity. Synthese (with Lukas Lewerentz).According to intentionalism, a demonstrative d refers to an object o only if the speaker intends d to refer to o. Intentionalism is a popular view in metasemantics, but Gauker has recently argued that it is circular. We defend intentionalism against this objection, by showing that Gauker’s argument rests on a misconstrual of the aim of metasemantics. We then introduce two related, but distinct circularity objections: the worry that intentionalism is uninformative, and the problem of intentional bootstrapping, according to which it is impossible to have referential intentions. We also show how intentionalists could respond to these new objections.Link via Publisher
- Upcoming: Carnap’s Internal Platonism. Modal Metaphysics: Issues on the (Im)Possible VII, Bratislava.
- 2018: Easy Ontology and Categorical Quantification. The 7th International Philosophy Graduate Conference, CEU Budapest; The 2018 Joint Session, Oxford
- 2018: Kant’s Mereological Relativism. Conceptions of Kantian Unity Workshop, Cambridge; GAP.10, Cologne.
- 2018: Demonstratives and Conflicting Intentions. 2nd Context, Cognition and Communication Conference, Warsaw (with Lukas Lewerentz).
- 2017: Quantification and Metaontological Deflationism. European Congress for Analytic Philosophy 9, München.
- 2016: Referential Intentions and the Metasemantics of Demonstratives. 1st Context, Cognition and Communication Conference, Warsaw (with Lukas Lewerentz).
- 2016: Frege versus Kaplan on Indexicals. 4th Seoul Philosophy Graduate Conference; 6th Humboldt/King’s Joint Graduate Workshop in Philosophy, Berlin.
- 2015: Keep it simple! Intentions in the Metasemantics of Demonstratives. Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy 2015 (with Lukas Lewerentz)