My PhD thesis is on Rudolf Carnap’s philosophy of mathematics, with a focus on questions of ontology. I argue that an old objection put forward by E.W. Beth poses a more serious challenge to Carnap’s position than he himself and his defenders have recognised so far. On my interpretation, Beth correctly identifies a deep tension between Carnap’s philosophy of mathematics and his behaviourist conception of language, which undermines his attempt to do mathematics without ontology.

I have papers under review on Carnap’s philosophy of mathematics and the role of names in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Please email me for drafts if you are interested.


  • 2021: Does Semantic Deflationism entail Meta-Ontological Deflationism? (with Thomas Schindler). The Philosophical QuarterlyLink via Publisher
  • Forthcoming: Easy Ontology, Quantification, and Realism. Synthese.Link via Publisher
  • 2019: Conceptualizing Kant’s Mereology. Ergo.Link via Publisher
  • 2018: Metasemantics, Intentions and Circularity. Synthese (with Lukas Lewerentz).Link via Publisher

Recent Talks

  • upcoming: Quine’s Empiricist Platonism. SSHAP 2021, Vienna.
  • upcoming: Carnapian Explication and the Limits of Voluntarism. Logik Café, Vienna.
  • 2020: Quine on Ontology and the Primacy of Truth. Serious Metaphysics Group, Cambridge.
  • 2019: Carnap’s Defence of Abstract Objects. Abstract Objects and Circularity Workshop, Munich; 3rd TiLPS History of Analytic Philosophy Workshop, Tilburg; Moral Sciences Club, Cambridge; 23rd Annual Graduate Philosophy Conference, Oxford.
  • 2019: Carnap’s Internal Platonism. Serious Metaphysics Group, CambridgeModal Metaphysics: Issues on the (Im)Possible VII, Bratislava.
  • 2018: Easy Ontology and Categorical Quantification. The 7th International Philosophy Graduate Conference, CEU Budapest; The 2018 Joint Session, Oxford

[Credit for picture of Carnap: University of Chicago Photographic Archive, apf1-01559, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library].