In my research, I examine temporal neutrality and the rationality of time-biases. Time-biases are preference-patterns sensitive to when events occur: for example, if you’re biased towards the near, you’d prefer good things to happen sooner rather than later, or bad things to be further away in the future. Temporal neutrality basically says that time-biases are irrational and you should not take time as such into consideration when making decisions.
I argue that temporal neutrality is false, as a bias towards the future is rationally permitted, and sometimes it’s even better for you to be future-biased. You’re future-biased if you prefer bad things to be past, over and done with rather than ahead of you, and good things to be future, ahead of you rather than behind you.
I am supervised by Theron Pummer and Simon Prosser, and hold a scholarship by the Heinrich-Böll Foundation.